

Environment for Technology Transfer Grows Tighter

BY SEBASTIAN GILL*



Analysis of international environmental issues: technology available in developing countries' cross-drinking

All three of the multilateral efforts to create an international regulatory framework for technology transfer have found fault. The U.S.'s Restrictive Business Practices Code has been ineffective and either ignored or defiantly rejected in practice. The technology transfer code efforts have run out of steam, most parties have either lost interest or given up.

In the case of the Paris Convention, what began as developing countries' efforts to narrow the convention to measure standards of patent protection took a rather dramatic turn by the mid 1980s. In particular, the United States has changed its previous stance (patent avoidance) and now is actively seeking stronger patent protection than can easily be guaranteed. Unconvinced that the World Intellectual Property Organization is even the appropriate forum for such an effort, the United States has taken up the issue of intellectual property protection in the Uruguay Round of GATT talks.

The history of international technology transfer is a story of increasing politicization. National policymakers gradually came to see the predominant modes of international technology transfer as impediments to the achievement of the goals of economic development and competitiveness. By the early 1970s both the developed and developing countries became interested in revisiting the old rules of the game and introduced open a series of multilateral negotiations to create an international regulatory framework for the transfer of technology.

This study addresses three cen-

tral questions: 1) how and why did the developed and developing countries come together to negotiate an international regulatory framework for the transfer of technology; 2) why did these efforts ultimately fail; 3) in the wake of these failed multilateral efforts, what are the emerging global trends in international technology transfer, and what do these trends imply for the future.

The efforts to establish an international regulatory framework for the transfer of technology included three sets of negotiations within the United Nations system. These were: 1) the negotiations for an international code of conduct for the transfer of technology, launched under the auspices of the U.S. Conference on Trade and Development; 2) negotiations on the revision of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Intellectual Property (under the auspices of the World Intellectual Property Organization); and 3) the Restrictive Business Practices Code of Conduct (UNCTAD).

The examination of multilateral negotiations in technology transfer issues provides a useful prism that sheds light on significant trends in international economic relations. It 1989 it had become evident that the parties to these negotiations had tacitly realigned their interests in technology transfer since the time the negotiations got underway.

HOW AND WHY STATES CAME TOGETHER TO NEGOTIATE

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, a number of developing countries passed novel legislation designed to enhance national control over the process of technology transfer. These "law leaders" came to believe that market-led technology transfer was detrimental to their

national economic development objectives. Policymakers in countries such as Argentina, Brazil, India, Mexico, and the countries of the Andean Pact (Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Chile, which withdrew from the Pact in 1976) complained that technology was overpriced and that technology suppliers (mostly multinational corporations) exploited developing country recipients. They argued that the terms of transfer set down by suppliers were unfair, and that the terms severely limited the recipients' control over the process. These "law leaders" passed tough laws, which reflected their dissatisfaction with earlier modes of technology transfer. The thrust of their legislation was to increase state intervention in the screening and control of technology transfer. As summarized by Ramirez:

In the technology field, advanced countries have sought to keep an monopoly companies, but now demand to supply their indigenous sources to replace foreign suppliers or to whom technology exports to advance transfer issues in foreign markets. It is now that the law led in technology, and technology firms in the choice of technology "appropriate" to the national environment and development goals.¹

These laws and practices were particularly important because they became the basis for the developing countries' proposals in the multilateral negotiations.

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The law leaders sought an international stamp of approval for their newly assertive policies, and felt that international instruments codifying these policies would reduce challenges to them from new and controversial national and regional legislations. Additionally, they sought to set a minimum standard to prevent potential foreign investors from playing developing countries off of each other in search of a better deal. They wanted to ensure that foreign investors would not flock to countries with more liberal policies at the expense of the law leaders. By getting an international regulatory framework, reflecting their approaches, they hoped to reduce their dependency on foreign technology suppliers and to stimulate the development of indigenous technology.

By the early 1980s the aspirations of these countries were further fueled by the success of the OPEC cartel. OPEC was able to extract significant political concessions from oil-dependent developed countries, and the cartel's success created the opportunity for developing countries' demands to be taken seriously. Developing countries wanted to free capitalizing on their new found power, and presented a package of demands for the establishment of a New International Economic Order (NIEO) within the U.N. forum. A New International Scientific and Technological Order, which would lead to massive resource transfers from the developed to the developing countries, was an integral part of the NIEO. The oil threat became important bargaining leverage, and developing countries were successful in getting the developed countries to meet with them in Geneva to negotiate their new demands.

■ International Codes ■

For their part, the developed countries also became interested in international codes of conduct. The activities of multinational corporations had given rise to friction, especially between the Americans and West Europeans. The developed countries were initially interested in the international codes of conduct within the U.N. system be-

cause of:

... the consistent policy statements issued within business associations (most notably the IBC) from non-aligned countries, that the home nations should extend similar regimes to the IBC, as a means of maintaining the conflicting demands of various national legislations which are generally placed on the IBC. Industry-wide working international forums as well as increasing the operating efficiency of the IBC. These countries ... view an international agreement as a possible means of eliminating conflicts of national legislations by limiting the harmonization of competing legislations.¹

The impetus for the Paris Convention revisited and the international code of conduct for the transfer of technology came from the developing countries. They wanted greater access to modern technology on more favorable terms. The Restatement Business Practices Code negotiations were initiated by the United States, but the developing countries took the opportunity to inject their demands into the deliberations. The RBP Code addressed business practices such as: abuse of dominant market power; tied sales; grantback licensing provisions; restrictions on resales; bulk sales; restrictions on volume and structure of production; and other practices that have been found in technology transfer contracts concluded between developed countries' suppliers and developing countries' recipients.

In all three cases the negotiations reflected diametrically opposed views about the appropriate role of the state in technology transfer transactions. For example, in the case of the international code of conduct for the transfer of technology, developing countries argued for provisions concerning significant government involvement in the steering and approval of technology contracts. By contrast the developed countries argued that reliance upon the market and a reduction in governmental intervention were the best ways to promote the international transfer of technology.

The Paris Convention deliberations were similarly hamstrung by a fundamental clash of views. Developing countries argued for a

revision of the Paris Convention in the direction of reducing patent protection. Their two main objectives in these negotiations were: 1) to get the Convention revised to strengthen developing countries' bargaining power to ensure that patents were worked in the granting country (via enforceable compulsory licenses), and 2) to get preferential treatment by being exempted from an important Article (3 quarter) of the Convention and thereby being allowed to prevent the importation of products manufactured under a process patent (e.g. cases in which the product would be manufactured domestically). By contrast, developed-country spokesmen argued that any dilution of patent holder's rights would have a deleterious effect on technology transfer, and that preferential treatment would undermine a cornerstone of the Convention — national treatment.

Finally, in the RBP Code negotiations the developed and developing clashed over the conception of what constitutes a restrictive (otherwise prohibited) business practice. The developed countries emphasized the traditional, more narrowly construed, antitrust criteria, namely, restrictive practices are those that adversely affect competition. The developing countries advocated a more broadly interpreted claim, that any business practice that adversely affected their economic development goals should be deemed restrictive and therefore prohibited. Unlike the other two sets of negotiations, the RBP negotiations were successfully concluded, a Code was agreed to and unanimously adopted in December 1980. The Code was vague enough to satisfy the parties at the time, but later when questions of interpretation arose it was clear that the parties had never really agreed on the spirit, substance, and purpose of the Code.

WHY THESE EFFORTS FAILED

There are several reasons why these efforts to establish an international regulatory framework ultimately failed. First, the negotiating parties had diametrically opposed

interests in these issues. Parties talked past each other in the negotiations, free-will or not disclaimer. The negotiating parties clashed repeatedly over the issue of governmental interventions in technology transfer.

Second, by the early 1980s it became clear that the NIEO movement had passed. The chances of developing countries' commodity power was impaired. OPEC's crucial satellite fell apart as member states divided by overproducing and caused oil prices to fall. Thus, developing countries lost their former bargaining leverage. Thirdly, the loss of the restraints of the developed countries' power to call the shots via such developing countries with renewed confidence and vigor. As a result there was a marked retreat from the multilateralism of the 1970s and a resurgence in bilateralism in technology transfer issues. In short, by the early 1980s the developing countries lost their platform.

Third, and most important, the main factor explaining the failure of these negotiations was the world economic situation of the early 1980s. The economic slump that began in the late 1970s and progressively worsened in the 1980s forced many countries to reconsider their interests in technology transfer. Power differentials between developed and developing countries were heightened under economic pressure. For developing countries, the development and transfer of technology requires external financing and foreign investment, and in those areas the situation has gotten rather bleak. Bank lending to developing countries dropped sharply in the 1980s. The resulting scarcity of external financing in the form of private bank loans has been accompanied by a sharp drop in foreign direct investment in developing countries. Between 1980 and 1986 inflows of foreign direct investment dropped by nearly 25%.⁴ Thus many developing countries are saddled with huge foreign debts, a drop in commodity prices, and a resurgence of protectionism in trade policies. These depressed economic conditions have led to significant changes in developing countries' policies and an aban-

ding of the NIEO program.

■ Bilateral Pressure ■

The developed countries have been successful in wicking bilateral pressure to force developing countries to dismantle earlier restrictive policies and to revise the very legislation that had inspired the multilateral efforts. Perhaps the most glaring example of this has been in the area of intellectual property protection. As noted earlier, the developing countries sought to weaken the protection of intellectual property, claiming that it was the "common heritage of mankind" and therefore it should be freely shared. Many developing countries had refused to extend protection to pharmaceuticals, for example, claiming that keeping them patent-free was in the public interest.

However, in recent years the United States has conferred increasing authority to the United States' Trade Representative under Section 301 of the Trade and Tariff Act to link trade sanctions to the protection of intellectual property. Beginning in 1982, the U.S. engaged in bilateral consultations with trade officials of states that were not guaranteeing effective protection. These initial bilateral consultations with countries such as Hungary, Taiwan, and Singapore were effective in spurring revisions in their patent, copyright, and trademark policies. This bilateral approach was extended in revisions to the Trade and Tariff Act which explicitly made failure to adequately protect intellectual property actionable under Section 301. Now the USITC has the authority "... not only to determine whether foreign government practices are unfair, but also to take action."⁵

Section 301 has emerged as a potent, albeit highly controversial, new instrument for U.S. industry. For example, in the pharmaceutical and pharmaceutical protection, U.S. producers created themselves as the Section 301 machinery to complain about Brazil's refusal to issue patents for pharmaceuticals. Brazil refused to alter its policy, and the U.S. responded by slapping "... a \$20 million tariff on imports of

Brazilian pharmaceuticals."⁶ Because so many developing countries have refused to permit patenting of pharmaceuticals as a matter of public interest, this action against Brazil indicates the shape of things to come.

The U.S. has sought to internationalize this linkage between trade and intellectual property protection in the Uruguay Round of GATT talks, even if this multilateral bid fails to gain sufficient support within GATT, the U.S. is ready and willing to impose its vision by threat of Section 301 action. Therefore, U.S. pressure abroad will not go away. In fact, the U.S. policy has been remarkably successful and this success has convinced U.S. policymakers of the merits of this approach.

Another measure of the confidence with which developed countries are pressing their interests in developing countries is the increased use of bilateral investment treaties. The draft rules of conduct were supposed to achieve a balance between suppliers' rights and obligations, and recipients' rights and obligations. However, there are no effective multilateral codes, and in their first bilateral investment treaties (used by both the EEC and the U.S.) only suppliers' rights and recipients' obligations are emphasized. These treaties have been concluded to introduce and promote new investments in developing countries. The willingness of many developing countries to enter into such agreements is part of their overall plan to attract foreign investment.

■ Multinational Control ■

The treaties resemble the protection policies of many of the developed countries as expressed in the multilateral negotiations for restructuring international relations in technology transfer. In short, the developing countries couldn't get their way at the multilateral level, and now the developed countries are getting their way at the bilateral level. Developing countries are being forced to relinquish their former degree of control over the technology transfer process.

In addition to these bilateral measures, developing countries have routinely re-evaluated prior restrictive policies in the face of severe economic pressures. In today's harsher international economic environment, it seems foolish to restrict and regulate the activities of foreign suppliers when foreign supplies and investments are so badly needed. Throughout Asia and Latin America the trend has been a marked rejection of restrictive policies and a sharp reduction in governmental intervention. As Nigel Harris points out:

There were financial exigencies combined with a growing sense of urgency to attract foreign capital and technology. . . . The countries were not attracted to restrictive trade policies, but rather to measures which encouraged the investment of public companies and efforts to attract the public sector to companies/enterprises. It went with a new, more market-oriented attitude toward foreign capital investments now completed in many of these macroeconomic programs with increasing or increasing success. . . .¹⁷

Most significantly, key "law loaders" who helped galvanize developing-country opinion to support anti-dependency codes of conduct have revised national policies along the lines espoused by Harris, Morris, Argentina, and the Andean Pact member states have liberalized their policies vis-à-vis foreign technology suppliers in an effort to attract investments.

For example, due to the economic crisis of the early 1980s the Mexican Government was forced:

. . . to extend itself to doing what was called an "industrial import substitution model." On a unit-by-unit basis, the government would acquire the equipment and domestic ownership was quickly used. A program of dismantling was begun with over 80 companies returned to private ownership in 1984.¹⁸

In 1981 Argentina revised its technology transfer policies. Argentina policymakers argued that their restrictive Law No. 20,498¹⁹ . . . caused stagnation of the flow of technology toward Argentina.²⁰ In response to this assessment Argentina enacted Law No. 22,494 in 1981, which ". . . recognizes that parties involved can negotiate freely, and that government cannot replace businessmen in making deci-

sions."²¹ The enactment of the 1981 law reflected a dramatic change of approach designed to reduce the role of the state in technology transfer.

In addition, Argentina policymakers took deliberate steps to make the connection between economic policymaking and the ideological factors that had animated earlier restrictive policies. Chaveselli summarized the new outlook by stating that, "the approach to the matter . . . must be economic and not ideological. When this last happens, and it has happened, technology and investments shall be neither and neither from our countries."²²

Finally, the Andean Pact countries, which had devised a bold regional challenge to foreign investors in its common investment regime (Decision 24 of the Andean Pact), have abandoned their restrictive policies. These countries blamed their strict laws for the lack of, and/or decline in, foreign investment. The Andean Pact countries (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela) are particularly eager to attract IEC investment. . . . which officials admit will be an uphill task, particularly against the stiff competition from other regions which are proving more attractive, like the Asian countries.²³

In July 1987 the Pact members eliminated Decision 24, ". . . which required majority national equity participation in new investment projects, demanded a gradual transfer of majority national ownership for old investments, and split [sic] out detailed restrictions on profit repatriation, patents, and licensing contracts."²⁴ Ecuador first proposed the elimination of Decision 24. Peru was the only member state to oppose it.²⁵ Decision 24 has been replaced by Decision 25, which allows each country to adopt whatever foreign investment regime it sees fit.²⁶

Since Decision 25 was enacted, Ecuador and Colombia have moved to liberalize their investment policies. In July 1987 Ecuador unveiled its new investment code, ". . . allowing companies to transfer profits equal to 30% of their in-

vestment — up to 40% if they export more than 40% of their production; those exporting over 80% and those working for multinationals transfer their profits freely."²⁷ Colombia also moved swiftly to change its policies. In July 1987 the Colombian Government:

. . . issued Decree 1661 and Decree 1674 allowing investors to own up to 100% of a company (previously being restricted to low investments in the purchase of shares in companies in licensed areas), and relaxing the obligations that now prevent companies only if they wish to accept the beneficial principles of the Andean regional market. Foreign investors will now have 25% (previously 20%) of profits abroad, and can also obtain top of long-term national loans from social Colombian government banks with international lending restrictions.²⁸

Thus, changes in developing countries, brought about by a world economic slump, signified a dramatic re-thinking of policies adopted in the late 1970s and early 1980s. These changes signified:

... a realization that what was done previously by the domestic market could have greatly benefited trade and thereby a slight substitute or complement to growth to a limit in the capacity to expand manufacturing export industries, to improve their trade position, to be encouraged to enter periods of the liberalization of some imports, a shift of emphasis away from public sector activity to the private sector, and the privatization of public sector activities.²⁹

The pressing economic problems faced by developing countries forced them to sacrifice many of the ideological premises that had fueled the effort to establish the IECs. These trends, becoming evident in the early 1980s, led most developing countries to lose interest in the multilateral effort.

Overall, developing countries have been exposed as far more rationalists than the OECD countries to the economic shocks of the 1980s. They have revised their earlier restrictive policies and blamed their previous positions as the source of their economic woes. They have also succumbed to increasing pressure from developed countries to open their markets for Northern goods and investments by entering into bilateral investment treaties which guarantee

foreigners a more liberal economic environment. They have revised their NRC approaches and opened for more liberal rules. However, this redefinition of interests under economic duties has not been confined to the developing world alone.

In developed countries the signs are clear that they too are re-thinking their previous approaches. In virtually every major sector of technology transfer — intellectual property practices, restrictive business practices, and foreign investment — developed countries have been changing their earlier approaches in the face of their economically competitive in a less hospitable international economic environment.

TRENDS, EFFECTS, THE FUTURE

Overall, it can be safely said that developed countries' policymakers and businessmen all realize that this new era is qualitatively different than that preceding it. As our OECD summarized:

The late 1980s and early 1990s have led to a more realistic and less volatile market environment every country, across the board, will show final competition and the limits of its own economy. Changes in markets, technology, interest rates, currency, government controls, supply and demand, and competition through out all happening at the time.¹⁷

Whatever consensus existed in simpler times has been thrown into doubt. The reports do not agree as to how to proceed, nor do policymakers. These changed economic conditions and lack of consensus among the experts have been coupled with the economic challenges posed by Japan and the newly industrializing countries of East Asia.

In developed countries the private sector and governments have responded quickly to these new challenges in an effort to remain economically competitive. In technology transfer investment patterns, restrictive business practices, and intellectual property, significant changes are taking place. Faced with uncertain futures, technology suppliers and investors have felt increasing pressure to stay away from risky ventures; this pressure has imparted conservatism for the international transfer of technology. For example, as a technology con-

tractor points out:

... in a concerted effort to raise different-conditions defense problems, particularly in the chemical and pharmaceutical sectors, have begun to examine their public trust and technology by examining their activities and control from historical to final packaged product. This is visible for behavioral organizations to lower product price, and the international control over and state of the market volume. This has been demonstrated by control — the control of the market — and an economic of the control dependent on the final product. New technology has been used to create new technology for increased production in new product competition or technological upgrading in an environment of the learning of new technology. As a consequence, as a challenge, being with the technology possible may cause and even define in quality. Modern technology has neither adequately available for transfer and access.¹⁸

This trend is not limited to the pharmaceutical and chemical industries, but is indicative of a broader pattern of minimizing the element of risk in technology transactions. A recent OECD study on trends in technology transfer linked to direct foreign investment found that between the period 1981-1985, "... in the United States and the United Kingdom, the share of receipts earned by the subsidiaries of multinational companies grew significantly."¹⁹ The study goes on to cite that:

In the United Kingdom, this share is now roughly equivalent to a third in over one-half and in the United States two-thirds in over one-half. This concentration in technology subsidiaries does not represent activities that these two companies prefer to transfer technology abroad via their subsidiaries, given the more control over their own technology transfer operations.²⁰

The OECD findings are reproduced in the table below:

SHARE OF RELATED FIRMS IN TOTAL RECEIPTS

| | Percentage receipts | | | | |
|----------------|---------------------|------|------|------|------|
| | 1987 | 1979 | 1975 | 1980 | 1985 |
| United States | 28.1 | 22.1 | 17.1 | 25.1 | 27.2 |
| United Kingdom | 32.1 | 22.1 | 17.1 | 25.1 | 27.2 |

Source: OECD, *Science and Technology Indicators*, No. 2 (1987), Investment and Competition.

Note: OECD 1986, *Investment and Competition*, No. 2.

This trend is likely to deepen in future years due to continuing economic pressure. This suggests that the primary agents of international technology transfers, multinational corporations, will increasingly limit

access to new technologies by maintaining strict control of their valuable assets within their affiliated enterprises. While this trend may imply more barriers, it is certainly not the preferred transfer mechanisms of the developing country recipients. Furthermore, if the risk-minimizing trend in chemical and pharmaceutical technology becomes widespread in other sectors there will be less technology available to license. Therefore, the prospects that developing countries will be able to get abundant technology on their preferred terms appear to be dim.

◀ Restrictive Practices ▶

In the area of restrictive business practices, at a time when more and more developing countries are revising their approaches to conform to more procompetitive international policies of the U.S. and the EEC, the U.S. and the EEC are rethinking their former policies. In the years following the 1980 adoption of the Restraints Business Practices Code it has become apparent that the international community's expressed commitment to ending the use of such practices has waned. As early as 1982 the U.M. Conference on Trade and Development began to express alarm at the "... method of operation in the control of restrictive business practices."²¹

This trend has continued to deepen in response to heightened competitive economic pressure. In particular, the U.S. and the EEC have begun to relax formerly rigorous anti-trust policies. For example, in 1982 the U.S. passed the Export Trading Company Act, which "... provides immunity to export trad-

ing companies from prosecution under antitrust laws, where the particular behavior engaged in has the approval by the Secretary of Commerce and the Justice Department."²² Furthermore, in 1982 the

U.S. Justice Department issued new guidelines for mergers and vertical business practices, which reflected "... an intended relaxation of vertical cross mergers and vertical restraints."¹⁸

The primary reason for this more relaxed approach to restrictive business practices is the economic challenge posed by Japan. Particularly regarding the intense competition in high-technology sectors, policymakers in both the U.S. and the EEC have come to feel that "...

the terms of trade in technology significantly favor Japan."¹⁹ Some U.S. analysts have argued that "... the Japanese have been freer-riders on U.S. research and development because they have received technology through licensing at a price much lower than the U.S. cost of developing that technology."²⁰ To explain this phenomenon, analysts have pointed to Japan's relatively permissive approach to antitrust in strategic economic sectors, which has spawned Japanese research consortia such as the Very Large Scale Integration consortium for the development of new micro-computers.

In response to this perceived advantage of Japanese antitrust policies and the desire to become more effective competitors in high-technology sectors, the U.S. and the EEC have taken steps to discipline this permissiveness. For example, in 1984 the U.S. Congress passed the National Competitive Research Act in an effort to increase the United States' international competitiveness. Under the Act, "all sectors are intended to benefit from the certainty that research pooling will not bring antitrust actions."²¹ Since this Act was adopted, two significant cooperative research arrangements have been established in the U.S.: MOC (Microelectronics and Computer Technology Corporation), and SEMATECH (semiconductor chip manufacturing consortium). The establishment of these research consortia is intended to "... promote export expansion and to counter foreign competition."²²

The EEC has not been immune to

these economic pressures. It has established an important research consortium, ESPRIT, composed of European electronics producers. Its activities include,

... also organized to train its interested low-technology U.S. and Japanese competitors in high-technology industries by exchanging joint ventures from common interest technology. Such as the development of a new type of battery for example, in 1980 completed a joint chemical venture for heavy metal processing and recycling and in 1986 it completed two micro-processor joint ventures.²³

These revised U.S. and EEC approaches to antitrust have been adopted in response to the fact that "... markets have become global rather than national ... and technological competition has often become as important as price competition."²⁴ The precise effects of these trends are not yet clear, but they certainly are ripe with anticompetitive potential. In any case it is evident that the current antitrust approaches of the EEC and U.S. diverge rather sharply from the spirit of the 1980 EEC Code.

CONCLUSION

It is clear that the international environment for technology transfer has gotten much tougher — more highly competitive and more difficult for developing countries. Developing countries have begun to play by the developed countries' rules in an effort to attract foreign investment and technology. However, due to competitive economic pressure among developed countries — particularly the U.S., West Europe and Japan — the suppliers' grip on internationally new technology has tightened considerably, especially vis-à-vis the developing world. Therefore, the amount of internationally new technology available to developing countries on their own terms will likely continue to shrink. The prospects for developing countries seeking technological self-reliance on their own terms appear to be bleak. As far as the developed countries are concerned, it remains to be seen how effective their new measures will be in enhancing their ability to be

internationally competitive.

My analysis suggests that, in order to understand past and emerging trends in the international transfer of technology between developed and developing countries, it is necessary to examine how policymakers evaluate their interests and how they convert those interests into new policies in response to opportunities and constraints.

FOOTNOTES

1. See Bennett, *Nationalism, Technology Transfer, Imports and Exports* (Reading, MA: Add. Longman Publications, 1981) p. 1.
2. See Shapiro, *Control of the United States Trade Policy* (Cambridge University Press, 1982), *Special International Journal* Vol. 14, No. 2, Spring 1979, p. 190.
3. See Shapiro, *Control of United States Trade Policy* (Cambridge University Press, 1982), *Special International Journal* Vol. 14, No. 2, Spring 1979, p. 190.
4. See Shapiro, *Control of United States Trade Policy* (Cambridge University Press, 1982), *Special International Journal* Vol. 14, No. 2, Spring 1979, p. 190.
5. See Shapiro, *Control of United States Trade Policy* (Cambridge University Press, 1982), *Special International Journal* Vol. 14, No. 2, Spring 1979, p. 190.
6. See Shapiro, *Control of United States Trade Policy* (Cambridge University Press, 1982), *Special International Journal* Vol. 14, No. 2, Spring 1979, p. 190.
7. See Shapiro, *Control of United States Trade Policy* (Cambridge University Press, 1982), *Special International Journal* Vol. 14, No. 2, Spring 1979, p. 190.
8. See Shapiro, *Control of United States Trade Policy* (Cambridge University Press, 1982), *Special International Journal* Vol. 14, No. 2, Spring 1979, p. 190.
9. See Shapiro, *Control of United States Trade Policy* (Cambridge University Press, 1982), *Special International Journal* Vol. 14, No. 2, Spring 1979, p. 190.
10. See Shapiro, *Control of United States Trade Policy* (Cambridge University Press, 1982), *Special International Journal* Vol. 14, No. 2, Spring 1979, p. 190.
11. See Shapiro, *Control of United States Trade Policy* (Cambridge University Press, 1982), *Special International Journal* Vol. 14, No. 2, Spring 1979, p. 190.
12. See Shapiro, *Control of United States Trade Policy* (Cambridge University Press, 1982), *Special International Journal* Vol. 14, No. 2, Spring 1979, p. 190.
13. See Shapiro, *Control of United States Trade Policy* (Cambridge University Press, 1982), *Special International Journal* Vol. 14, No. 2, Spring 1979, p. 190.
14. See Shapiro, *Control of United States Trade Policy* (Cambridge University Press, 1982), *Special International Journal* Vol. 14, No. 2, Spring 1979, p. 190.
15. See Shapiro, *Control of United States Trade Policy* (Cambridge University Press, 1982), *Special International Journal* Vol. 14, No. 2, Spring 1979, p. 190.
16. See Shapiro, *Control of United States Trade Policy* (Cambridge University Press, 1982), *Special International Journal* Vol. 14, No. 2, Spring 1979, p. 190.
17. See Shapiro, *Control of United States Trade Policy* (Cambridge University Press, 1982), *Special International Journal* Vol. 14, No. 2, Spring 1979, p. 190.
18. See Shapiro, *Control of United States Trade Policy* (Cambridge University Press, 1982), *Special International Journal* Vol. 14, No. 2, Spring 1979, p. 190.
19. See Shapiro, *Control of United States Trade Policy* (Cambridge University Press, 1982), *Special International Journal* Vol. 14, No. 2, Spring 1979, p. 190.
20. See Shapiro, *Control of United States Trade Policy* (Cambridge University Press, 1982), *Special International Journal* Vol. 14, No. 2, Spring 1979, p. 190.
21. See Shapiro, *Control of United States Trade Policy* (Cambridge University Press, 1982), *Special International Journal* Vol. 14, No. 2, Spring 1979, p. 190.
22. See Shapiro, *Control of United States Trade Policy* (Cambridge University Press, 1982), *Special International Journal* Vol. 14, No. 2, Spring 1979, p. 190.
23. See Shapiro, *Control of United States Trade Policy* (Cambridge University Press, 1982), *Special International Journal* Vol. 14, No. 2, Spring 1979, p. 190.
24. See Shapiro, *Control of United States Trade Policy* (Cambridge University Press, 1982), *Special International Journal* Vol. 14, No. 2, Spring 1979, p. 190.